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may be awakened in the matter, as will by these or some other
measures, rescue a law, just and beneficent in its principles, from
the disastrous results of its inefficient methods of administration.
The advantages proposed to be gained by the amendments suggested are, in brief, the insuring a greater impartiality and independence of action of the assistant judicial officers; the dispensing
with the unnecessary and extraordinary charges now incurred during
a period in which all interests imperatively call for immediate
action, instead of most expensive and wasteful inactivity; a
reasonably definite determination of the amount of legal expenses,
and an opportunity to creditors -and debtor amicably to adjust
settlements, undisturbed by the dictation of mercenary malcontents
and free from the trammels of official forms.
J. M.
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THE EAST SAGINAW STREET RAILWAY CO. v. AUGUST BOHN,
SUING BY HIS NEXT FRIEND.
It is the duty of a street railway company to provide vehicles which insure
security to their passengers, and not to suffer them to occupy unsafe places upon
such vehicles.
If this duty is neglected and a passenger is injured, he cannot recover damages
of the company if his own neglect of the duty of self-preservation contributed to
the injury.
But duty can only be predicated of one who has capacity to understand and
ability to perform it. Therefore, a child not of an age or discretion to understand
the danger in riding upon the front platform of a street car, cannot be charged
with negligence in so doing.
Parents have a right to assume that street railway companies furnish conveyances which are reasonably safe. and have regulations which preclude persons
riding in unsafe places upon them. They cannot, therefore, be charged with negligence in permitting their children to ride on the street cars without escort if the
company consent so to receive them.
While a street railway company would not be liable to a person of suitable discretion who, being warned of the danger in riding upon the front platform of the
car, should persist in doing so, yet in the case of a person lacking such discretion,
and to whom consequently negligence could not be imputed, it would be the duty
of the ccmpany not to stop with a warning, but to compel such person to occupy
the proper place in the car.
A child four and a half years of age took a street car with his brother eight
years older, and both sat down on the front platform with their feet on the step.
The conductor took the fare and says he told the boys to go into the car; but this
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was denied. There was no other interference with their riding there. rh
younger boy in some way not explained got off the car when in motion, and was
run over. Held:
1. That the parent was not guilty of negligence in permitting the children to
take the cars alone.
2. That negligence was not imputable to the younger boy.
3. That it was not imputable to the older boy unless he was of an age and discretion to understand the danger, and also the difficulty of protecting both himself
and his brother against it.
4. That negligence was imputable to the railway company in permitting the
boys thus to ride.

COOLEY, J.-The suit in the court below was brought against
the railway company on behalf of August Bohn, an infant, to recover damages for an injury done to him by one of the cars of the
company, and, as was claimed, through the negligence of its servants. The declaration avers that on the 4th day of August
1869, the railway company was a carrier of passengers by cars
drawn by horses over its track laid down in certain streets in the
city of East Saginaw, and to a certain point in South Saginaw,
which cars as well as the persons who should become passengers
upon said railway were under the power, control and management
of certain servants of said company; that the plaintiff being then
an infant of the age of four years, became a passenger on one of
said cars with the permission and consent of defendant; that he
entered upon the front end of said car, and finding the door thereof
closed and the way thereto barred and obstructed by trunks, boxes
of merchandise and other freight, be, the said plaintiff, with the
consent and permission of said defendant, was seated upon the
platform of said car with other passengers then and there being
carried by said defendant, and under the care, charge and direction
of said defendant, and in that position started upon his journey
from a point where Genesee street crosses said track to another
point opposite Darmstatter's brewery; that while so seated the
driver of said car, being then and there a servant of said defendant, and having the care and control of such passengers, occupied
a part of such platform, and the conductor of said car, being then
and there also a servant of said defendant and having the care,
control and management of said car and all persons thereon or
about said ear, opened said door from the inside thereof, and collected the faire of the passengers upon said platform, and then returned to the inside of said car and closed the door thereof. And
plaintiff avers that the said defendant then and there carelessly,
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-,egligently and wantonly consented, permitted and required the
said plaintiff, while so being transported as aforesaid, to pursue
his said journey upon the said platform in a careless, unsafe,
dangerous and exposed situation; that before the car reached the
end of plaintiff's said journey, he, the plaintiff, while using all
due care, diligence and caution, was thrown violently to the ground
by the motion of said car, in such a manner that the wheels of said
car passed over his left leg, and broke and injured it in such a
manner that amputation thereof became necessary to save the life
of said plaintiff.
On the trial it was not disputed that 'an injury occurred to the
plaintiff in the manner and of the nature alleged, and the questions
raised were whether the servants of the defendant were guilty of
negligence contributing to the injury, and if so, then whether the
plaintiff or those. in whose charge he was in fact or in law were
not also guilty of contributory negligence of a nature and degree
which would preclude recovery. To understand the legal questions
it may be advisable to present the several accounts of the transaction given by the plaintiff's brother, who was with him at the
time, the plaintiff himself being too young to be sworn, and the
conductor of the car and one passenger. The driver was not
sworn.
The brother, Henry Bohn, testified that at the time of the
injury he was about twelve years and six months old, and the
plaintiff four years and five months; that about eleven o'clock in
the forenoon his mother sent him with a jug to a store after a
gallon of vinegar; the distance appears to have been about a mile;
the plaintiff wanted to go along, and was at first refused permission, but the mother afterwards consented, and told the witness
that they should walk down but might take a street car back, and
gave him money to pay the fare ; they went accordingly and got the
vinegar, and returning took a street car, which, however, was found
to be going only a part of the distance, and they were obliged to
get out and wait for another. When the second car came along,
they got upon the front platform; there was a lot of boxes there
piled up, with trunks on top of them half way to the top of
the door; the driver was on the platform and a Mr. Randall; the
boys sat down on the platform with their feet on the steps, and
the witness held the jug between his legs; after the car started
the conductor came out to take the fare; he put his hand on the
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shoulder of the witness, who looked up and seeing what was
wanted, paid him six cents, then the conductor told the driver to
let the boys off at the brewery, and then went back into the car
and shut the door; he said nothing more, and quitted the car
right afterwards; before they got to the brewery, plamuiff stood
up to see if they were near home, and just as he went to sit down
the jarring of the car tore away the hand of witness from plaintiff; witness was not looking at plaintiff at the time, and when he
'looked around he was gone; the driver asked him if his brother
fell off, and witness replied yes; the driver hit his horses and
went right on; witness asked him to stop but he did not, and
witness then picked up the jug and jumped off, and found his
brother had been run over and one leg crushed.
The evidence of the conductor differs from that of this witness
in several important particulars. He denies that the front platform of the car was occupied by boxes or trunks, though he says
there was a basket standing there, and he also says that when he
went out on the platform and took the fare from the older boy he
told them to come into the car. Randall, the passenger, who was
on the platform with the boys, corroborates the conductor as to the
absence of boxes or trunks. He also claims to have been looking
at the little boy at the time of the occurrence, and testifies that
.he jumped off, and that when the older boy asked the driver to
stop and let him off, he checked the speed of his horses, though
he did not stop.
This is perhaps a sufficient statement of evidence given to
answer the purpose of presenting the legal points. The defence
insisted that the allegation in the declaration that the plaintiff
when lie entered upon the platform found the door closed and obstructed by boxes, &c., and seated himself on the platform with
permission of the company, &e., was material and must be proved.
The defence also claimed and requested the judge to charge the
jury, that if the plaintiff on the occasion in question rode upon
the car with the knowledge and permission of his mother, she
knowing that he was attended by no other person than his brother,
a youth of the age of twelve or thirteen, and that plaintiff fell
off or jumped from the cars voluntarily, or from a want of discretion and beca,'e he was not properly guarded by his attendant,
lie was not entitled to recover. Also, that if the plaintiff befire
the accident was seated on the platform of the car with his feet
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on the step and some means of holding himself in his seat by
his hands, and that he was in company with an older brother
capable of exercising a reasonable discretion for the plaintiffs
safety, and that he was safe while thus sitting from being thrown
off the car by its motion, the defendant's servants in charge of the.
car were not required to exercise care or oversight to prevent the
plaintiff from voluntarily changing his position, and thereby exposing himself to be jostled off the car, or from attempting with
childish indiscretion to get off the car while in motion. Also, that
if from the plaintiff's evidence it is doubtful whether the plaintiff jumped off or fell off from the car, the plaintiff could not
recover. Also, that if there were seats inside the car, and plaintiff was seated on the platform by his brother with the intention
to ride there to their destination, and was told by the conductor to
come in and did not, and the accident would not have occurred if
they had been in the car, the plaintiff could not recover. These
requests and others of like nature were refused.
The requests in effect assumed that if the older of the two boys
was wanting in discretion for the protection of himself and his
brother, it was negligence in the mother to permit the plaintiff to
go upon the cars without other attendance ; and if the brother had
'such discretion, then it was negligence in him to seat himself and
the plaintiff on the platform as he did; and in either case the
defendant would be excused from legal responsibility for the negligence imputed to them because the injury resulted from the
concurrent negligence of the mother or brother who for the time
must be regarded as occupying the position of guardian for the
plaintiff, and whose negligence, therefore, was in law imputable to
the plaintiff himself.
If the railway company at the time had been under no obligation of care or responsibility for the plaintiff as a passenger upon
their cars, the question of liability would be very different from
the one now presented. But this company hold themselves out as
carriers of passengers for all who may come, and provide vehicles
which promise reasonable protection and security to those who
commit themselves to their care and custody for the purpose of
carriage. They do not reject a child because he is young and
wanting in discretion, or a person weak or demented, or one physically incapable of self-protection against the accidents which might
result from careless management. This mode of transit, on the
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other hand, is supposed to be specially adapted to the needs of
those classes of community whose physical strength and capacity
is least, or whose limited means put the more expensive modes of
conveyance beyond their reach. It is unquestionably a great convenience to men of business, in the ready facilities it affords for
passing from place to place in response to business calls, but it is
not less so to the poor laborer employed at a distance from his
home, or to the pupil residing a long way from his place of instruetion, or to the child whose parents' necessities compel his being
sent upon errands, or to the families of laboring men who by
means thereof are enabled to enjoy occasional holidays in the public parks, or in forests or open fields, which otherwise would only
be accessible to them at an expense beyond their means. All these
classes quite as much, at least, as those whose circumstances make
them more independent, are invited by the railway company to
take passage upon their cars; and it cannot be held that a parent
is guilty of negligence in permitting a child who lacks the judgment and discretion of an adult person to accept the invitation,
unless the car would be to the child a dangerous conveyance notwithstanding any oversight the company may reasonably be expected to provide. If it is thus dangerous the question may be a
serious one, whether it may not become the duty of the legislature
out of regard to human life to prohibit by law the reception upon
the cars of such children unless attended by parents or guardians.
Such a prohibition would go far towards striking a fatal blow at
the profits of these companies, inasmuch as the use of their cars
by the poorer classes of community would to a great extent be
precluded, if escort for children must always be provided.
The privileges of these railway companies are conferred by the
state, and it is assumed in granting them that the mode of conveyance they provide is not only convenient but is reasonably safe.
The state would never grant the corporate privileges on any other
supposition, nor would it permit the use of the public streets by
persons holding themselves oxt as common carriers of passengers
whose means of transportation make their invitation to a passenger to take conveyance with them, an invitation to danger and
possible mutilation and death. A railway company, for instance.
who should propose to carry passengers upon an open platform
without seats, would not only, in consideration of the danger attending that mode of conveyance, be denied special privileges in
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the streets for their vehicles, but it would become the duty of the
authorities, from a proper regard to the lives and limbs of its citizens, to prohibit such a constant and dangerous temptation as such
vehicles might prove to thoughtless or foolhardy persons. It is
not the policy of the law to permit even the most mature and
capable persons to run recklessly or unnecessarily into danger;
but from the highest considerations of the public good it seeks to
protect every individual citizen not only against assaults and
wrongs at the hands of others, but also against the risks that might
spring from his own folly or rashness. The law does not content
itself with denying him a remedy against other persons where
through their concurring negligence he has suffered an injury, but
it seeks to lessen the probabilities of negligent injuries by precautions which those likely to suffer them are required to observe.
Our general incorporation acts, and especially those relating to
railways, contain many such regulations.
If public policy would forbid the use of open and unseated
vehicles for the transportation of passengers, then we are warranted in saying that the railway company when they suffer their
passengers to ride upon the platform of their cars, which are in
like manner though perhaps not to the same extent dangerous, are
guilty of violating.a wholesome rule of public policy, and of a
disregard of their duty to the community from which they receive
their privileges. They may nevertheless permit this in a great
many cases without incurring pecuniary responsibility, because
the persons suffered thus to ride are equally with themselves guilty
of a violation of duty, and where the concurrent neglect of the
two results in an injury, the law will not suffer the injured party
to recover from the other, because to do so would give him compensation for his own default, and remove an important security
against the like defaults in the future.
But duty can only be predicated of one who has capacity to
understand and ability to perform it. If the owner of a vehicle
which it was dangerous to ride upon should invite a person as
capable of ufiderstanding the danger as himself, to take passage
with him, the latter, if he should accept the invitation and be
injured, would have no remedy, because of his neglect of the duty
of self-protection. But if children under the age of discretion
to understand the danger should be invited into it in like manner,
the carrier could plead no exemptions, because upon the child no
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such duty could rest in such a case, and the law would not be embarrassed with difficulty in fixing the responsibility where alone it
should rest. If the proper guardian of the child should be present
and consent, the carrier might perhaps be relieved of his responsibility, but this would not be because he was justified by the consent, but because, with fault on both sides, the law will not under
take the task of justly apportioning the consequences according
to the culpability.
A railway car, however, is not supposed to be a dangerous
vehicle of conveyance to those who take it. It is a covered conveyance, provided with doors and seats, and passengers are expected to occupy the seats. A mother who consents to her infant
children going upon the cars, is supposed to know that it is a
reasonably safe conveyance. She may also be supposed to know
that the proprietors have regulations which preclude persons riding
in unsafe positions upon it, and that the persons in charge have
authority to enforce these regulations. She will, therefore, with
reason expect that her children, if they lack judgment to decide
for themselves what the dangerous positions are, will be warned
and kept out of them by the authority of those in charge. Under
such circumstances, the mother may, with the utmost confidence,
intrust her children to the street car, on the supposition that
instead of sending them into unusual dangers, she has actually
placed them where they will be safer than upon the public streets
on foot. She can consequently be guilty of no negligence in permitting them to take the cars by themselves, if they have reached
an age which would justify their being suffered in the public streets,
and the railway company have no regulations which will preclude
their being received thus unattended. If they are unsuitable persons to receive and convey without a guardian, the company might
doubtless refuse to receive them, but consenting to receive them as
passengers, it would become their duty to give all reasonable care
and make reasonable provision for their safety.
That the duty of the railway company not to permit persons to
ride in unsafe places on their cars is the same, and rests upon the
same reasons, with their duty not to make use of vehicles wholly
unsafe, appears to me entirely clear. There are without doubt
some limitations upon that duty, growing out of the manner in
which their business is usually and properly conducted, but it does
not become necessary to consider those limitations at any length.
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in the present case. Such carriers could not in reason be required
to be insurers of their passengers against all dangers, nor, perhaps, to employ a person to keep watch upon their passengers, to
protect them against dangers resulting from their own folly or
neglect. Perhaps it is admissible that the driver should be also"
conductor, in which case he could not be expected to watch
against persons falling off the rear platform or crawling out of the
window. If however, it was dangerous for passengers to stand or
sit on the front platform where the driver himself would be, it
would not only be his right and duty to notify any who might
occupy it of the danger, but if they were of an age not to be
likely to understand the risk or able to judge for themselves, or if
he knew them to be insane or otherwise unable to exercise discretion, the duty would not be fully performed without an enforcement of proper regulations to compel their occupying positions less
exposed.
The conductor in this case claims to have performed his duty
when he directed the boys to go into the car. Henry Bohn
denies that he was so told; but we may safely believe the conductor
without charging the boy with intentional misstatement, as the
noise of the car is always considerable, and the conductor does not
seem to have taken any pains to see that his direction was obeyed
or even understood. It is quite possible it was not heard at all.
Assuming that it was, the question remains whether by giving it
the conductor performed his full duty. I think he did not, unless the
oldest boy was of an age and discretion to justify his being allowed
to act and judge both for himself and for his brother, and to take
upon himself all consequences. If he had not reached such
an age and discretion, the conductor's duty did not stop with the
warning, but the warning should have been an order, and either
he or the driver should have compelled obedience.
In judging of the measure of responsibility to which the older
boy should be held, something more must be considered than
merely his age. Some dangers the youngest persons shrink fiom
instinctively, while an appreciation of others only comes from extended observation and experience. A child of four will shudder
at the proximity of a precipice when one of thirteen to whose
knowledge an injury from careless riding upon a street car has
never come, will not anticipate danger from anything apparently
so safe. It is within the observation of all travellers and all per
VOL. xxI.-49
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sons having the management of railway trains, that boys of from
eight to fourteen years of age are much more ready to place themselves in exposed positions upon cars, and to jump off and on
recklessly, than are persons of mature years. It is not necessarily
to be assumed that they purpose subjecting themselves to danger,
but they lack the experience and observation which teach the
danger, and without which a man in the full maturity of- his intellect might be guilty of a recklessness equal to theirs. At that
period of life, too, the childish impulses and propensities are as
strong and as active as ever, and if notified of a danger they
cannot be expected to keep a consciousness of it present to the
mind, or to observe that watchful ward against it which would be
looked for in an older person. It would be unreasonable and
cruel in the extreme to hold such a child responsible for a prudence
and foresight beyond his years, and for a perception and compre.
hension of dangers which are only learned by experience or by
observation and reflection.
Assuming, however, that a child has reached an age to be properly intrusted with the direction of his own actions, it does not
follow that he is fit to take upon himself authority over the actions
of others. A child of twelve might :ride with entire safety in a
position where, though exposed to danger, his strength and agility
would be sufficient for his protection, but where it would be quite
out of his power to render much assistance in the protection of a
helpless person. If under such circumstances he should expose
himself only and suffer an injury, it might fairly be charged to
his own folly ; but if he should expose a younger child intrusted
to his care, any other person in a position of authority over him,
would justly be held highly blamable if he did not interfere. To
protect another, agility and strength may not be sufficient, but be
must have judgment, foresight and constant watchfulness, so as to
anticipate possible dangers, and be prepared with his assistance
however unexpectedly the perils may come. He must have his
boyish propensities under control, so as not to let his curiosity, or
anything else, throw him for a moment off his guard. The degree
of watchfulness and prudence required would of course be proportioned to the nature and degree of the danger, but it may be
laid down as an axiom that whatever is beyond the ordinary judgment and discretion of such a child, cannot reasoiably be required
of him, and consequently his failure to perform it cannot be treated
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as neglect of duty. The measure of reasonable discretion must
be the measure of duty in such a case.
Whether the older boy in this case had reached an age at which
it could be said he ought to have understood the danger and to
have kept his brother from it, was the question really at issue.
His watchfulness was found in fact to be equal to his own protection,
but though he kept his brother by his side and his hand upon him,
it was not equal to the protection of both. It may safely be assumed of such a boy that he would not appreciate the difficulty of
protecting another where he could protect himself as a person more
mature and of more experience would be likely to do, and this fact
the conductor and the driver were bound to understand and to act
upon. They were bound to know that they were carrying the
plaintiff in an exposed place without suitable protection, and their
neglect of duty was very obvious and gross in permitting it. We
cannot say that the brother was guilty of a like default.
There are doubtless some children even of this tender age who
show a prudence and thoughtfulness, and an ability to guard against
dangers, commonly belonging to riper years, and it may therefore
be urged that the judge erred in not submitting more distinctly to
the jury the question of the actual discretion and judgment of this
boy. Such cases, however, are purely exceptional. They are
commonly cases of premature maturity, brought about by want,
or by the absence of suitable protection, and the consequent necessity for self-protection against rough treatment at the hands of
others. It was not claimed that this case was exceptional, and we
discover no evidence in the record to show it unless proof that the
boy had been in the habit of riding on the cars could be said to
have that tendency. That experience, unless he had known of
accidents from riding in exposed places on the car, would be quite
as likely to lead him into a false security as to disclose to him the
dangers, and consequently, standing alone, nothing could be predicated upon it. The judge and the jury, I think, had the right to
assume that this boy had the ordinary discretion and judgment of
boys of his years, and no right to require of him any more. The
judge charged the .jury that the railway company were required
to act towards the plaintiff in the situation in which he was; that
is, considering his age and capacity and the fact that he was there
with a brother of the age named. They were not required to use
toward him the same care and skill that might have been required
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had he been alone. They received him as he was, attended by his
older brother, and were required to act towards him with that fact
in view. The jury, he said, could readily see that possibly less
care might be required than if he were there alone. They
received him and carried him over their road, in connection with
the dangers of passage, on that car with the older brother, and
they were bound to act towards him just as he was situated. And
he further instructed them that if the brother was of an age to
have exercised reasonable discretion, and plaintiff was seated where,
with the exercise of such discretion in his behalf, he could ride
in safety, plaintiff was not entitled to recover unless the injury
resulted wholly from the negligence of the company. This charge
appears to me all the defendants had a right to demand.
If it was negligence in the company to suffer the plaintiff to
ride on the platform, it is immaterial whether or not he was compelled to ride there by the difficulty of getting into the car. The
action is for negligence in carrying him in an exposed and dangerous place on the car, and the negligence was the same whether he
was compelled or only permitted to ride there. The culpability
might have been greater in the former case, and it might have
been proper to give heavier damages; but the case is made out
when the negligence is established.
The suggestion that the plaintiff is not entitled to recover, if it
is doubtful how he got off the cars, has no force. Randall, who was
father-in-law to the conductor, testified that he jumped off, but his
testimony throughout is exceedingly unsatisfactory, and I think
the jury would have been well warranted in concluding that the
plaintiff, in rising up from some childish impulse or reason, was
thrown off by the motion of the car. This subject was fairly left
to the jury on the evidence, and defendants could ask no more.
I find no error in the record, and am of opinion that the judgment should be affirmed with costs.
The other justices concurred.
The question discussed in the preceding
case-how far a child of such age, as
not to lie
cntirel:" capable of forexeeing
or guarding against the ordinary perils
ot travl. upon the highway,, or upon
railwai,, is thereby to be precluded from
recoveiiug damages, sustained through
the negligence of others, provided lie do

allthat could fairly be expected of one
in his condition, to ccape the consequencc of Tic'i negligcice-has long
occupied the atit iion of the courts. and
there still -eeis to remain inuch of upparent conlict iu the deeiou : lloA I,
J.- in ll",'iyl
v. 11.,..
.
4 Allen
283. But we believe, that much of this
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apparent conflict in the decisions will
disappear, upon a careful analysis of the
different classes of cases in which these
questions arise.
1. There are many cases where children, of too tender age to be suffered to
go abroad at all, have accidentally wandered away from home, or from their attendants, and fallen upon dangers from
which they were wholly incompetent to
escape, and thereby suffered serious damage, or even the loss of life ; where indeed the other party was in some fault, but
without any knowledge or ground of apprehension, that he was thereby exposing such a helpless child to peril in
consequence. The case last cited was
that of a child, only two years old,
wandering upon a street railway track
and there being run over by the passing
car, driven indeed at an unlawful rate
of speed. But if the driver had no
knowledge of a child being upon the
track, in time to arrest the car before
reaching it, and no reason to expect such
an occurrence, we believe all the cases
will concur in the conclusion to which
the court came in that case, that no recovery could be had, although the
learned judge seems to suppose, that
some of the cases had adopted views in
conflict with those of that court. This
class of cases may be designated for
convenience, as that where the child is
found in a place, where he had no right
to be, and where there was no antecedent
reason to expect he would come, and
where the injury was inflicted before the
other party had any knowledge or expectation that he was in peril. In this
class of cases the primary and chief
fault lies at the door of those who have
the child in charge, and there can be no
recovery, unless in excepted cases hereafter noticed. This class of cases is considerably numerous, but need not be
further specified. Hartfield v. Roper, 21
Wend. 615, and other cases in that state
seem to go on this ground, as do also
Singleton v Eastern Counties Ry., 7 C.

B. N. S. 287, where a child three and a
half years old was injured by a passing
train, and.ughes v.hfafie, 2 H. & C.744.
2. There is another class of cases,
more numerous probably, where the
child is very young and by no means
fully competent to guard against all the
perils of the way, but where nevertheless he is properly suffered to be abroad
and is therefore lawfully where he is
found, and where he suffers injury from
the negligence of others ; but which he
probably would have escaped, if he had
been of full age and discretion. The
question here will arise, how far such a
child is precluded from recovery, by
reason of his incapacity to exercise all
the precaution which adults might ordinarily be expected to do, provided he does
all that could fairly be expected of one
of his age ? The true rule here is, that
the recovery cannot be denied upon any
such ground. The child, being properly
at large, upon his lawful employment,
is entitled to the same protection and
defence, and upon the same conditions
as others. He is not to be so far outlawed in consequence of his natural infirmity of age, as to be precluded from
demanding the protection of the law,
except upon impossible conditions, that
of exercising a degree of discretion
which he has not attained. Under such
a rule of construction no child could
ever be trusted to attend school, or go
of errands, except under protection of
an attendant. And we do not well see
how any such rule would fail to embrace
women, as well as children, many of
whom are far less experienced in the
perils of highways and railways, than
most lads of twelve years, who have been
more abroad.
To this class may be referred Lynch v.
Nurdin, I Q. B. 29 ; Rauch v. Lloyd,
31 Penn. St. 358 ; Robinson v. Cone,
22 Vt. 213; Daley v. Norwich J- 1orcester Ry., 26 Conn. 591 ; Bronson v.
Southbury, 37 Conn. 199 ; Oldfteld v. N.
Y, 4- H.Ry., 3 E. D. Smith 103; Lynch
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v. Smith, 104 Mass. 52. And the late
case of Downs v. New York CentralBy.,
47 N. Y. 83, where the mother allowed
her son, twelve years old, to go into another car to find a seat, there being no
vacant one in that car, and he was injured in leaving the car, may be regarded as coming under this head. The
court held him entitled to recover for
the injury, by reason of the neglect of
the company, although not able himself
to exercise the same skill and prudence
in escaping the consequences of it as an
adult. The last two cases seem to have
reconciled the apparent conflict in those
states: Mulligan v. Curtis, 100 Mass.
512; see also, Com. v. Met. Rd. Co., 107
Id. 236.
3. There is another considerably numerous class of cases, where children
are received as passengers on railways,
and suffer injury by reason of the negligence of the servants of the company,
and their own want of wisdom and experience in escaping its consequences.
Here the rules of law not only entitle
the child to the same protection, as an
adult in the same condition, notwithstanding his own want of capacity, but
also impose a correspondingly greater
degree of watchfulness on the part of the,
carriers, in proportion to tile want of
full capacity on the part of their passengers to guard against the perils of the
journey. This is the rule adopted, and
so satisfactorily illustrated, in the principal case. The same rule was also
adopted by tie Supreme Court of the
U. S. in the recent case of Georgetown
By. v. Gladinon, 15 Wall. 401, where
a child, seven years of age, was allowed
to recover for an injury sustained through
the negligence of the company, if he
exercised the ordinary prudence of such
a child. But C(orn. v. Met. Rd., recently
decided in the Supreme Court of AIassachao-etts, seemed to take a different
view. This rule of increased care in
proportion to the infirmities of those
with whom we have to do will no doubt

apply, as between carriers and their passengers, in all cases of known infirmity.
It has indeed been held that where an
insane passenger became separated from
his attendant in a train, and could not
produce his ticket on the demand of the
conductor, and was consequently put out
and killed by a passing train, there could
be no action maintained, because the
fault was that of the attendant, and the
conductor had no knowledge of the infirmity of the passenger: Willetts v. N.
Y. di Erie By., 14 Barb. 585. But if
such passenger had been a child, ten
years of age, and the conductor had pursued the same course, with the same
result, there could be no question of his
and the company's responsibility, civilly,
if not!criminally. Such a course would
be regarded not only illegal, but posi..
tively inhuman and barbarous, by all
right-minded men. It is so in all th
relations and duties of life. Our ow
obligations are to be measured by th,
known infirmities and necessities of those
with whom we have to do. If it were
not so, life would not only be deprived
of all safety and enjoyment, but become, at
once, an intolerable strife, a mere game
of force against infirmity. And, while
we cannot altogether condemn the course
of those writers and judges, who seem
to have become enamored with fixed
rules and hard and fast lines, in
every department of the law, here as
well as elsewhere; we cannot refrain
from the expression of the sentiment, or
feeling, that in all such endeavors, when
carried beyond certain very narrow
limits, justice is commonly sacrificed to
a false love of symmetry. But there is
one abiding consolation in all such cases,
that the power of truth is omnipotent,
where it has free scope, and that it will
prevail; Magna est verias et prevalebit.
This shows the great power of an unwritten system of lawv over a written
code, in finally reaching the point of absolute justice. If this subject had been
codified by the best lawyers in England
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and America, it would never have
reached its present state of perfection.
We may now refer to certain well
recognised exceptions to the foregoing
rules.
1. Where the defendant had reason to
expect that children might come upon
his works, he is culpable for not so constructing his machinery and so using it,
that detriment shall not accrue to them
Kay v. Penna. Ry., 65 Penn. St. 269;
Stout v. S. C. J- P. Ry., 11 Am. L. Reg.
N. S. 226; B. 6- J. Ry. v. Snyder, 18
Ohio N. S. 399 ; Lynch v. Nurdin, supra.
2. Where a child is in the keeping of
an attendant, others having relations of
duty towards the child will not be required to exercise any greater circumspection than in the case of an adult.
And any negligence suffered to be cominitted by the child through the inattention of the attendant, will have the same
effect in precluding a recovery, as in the
case of an adult : Waite v. North Eastern
Ry., E. B. & E. 719 ; 5 Jur. N. S. 936.
So that in the principal case, if the child

had been in the care of an adult, it
might not have become the duty of the
conductor to drive him off the front platform, as being an unfit place for any one
and especially a child to be carried. But
the child having no adult attendant it
clearly became the duty of the conductor
to compel it to remove to a safe place
within the car. But when one, without
authority, volunteers to take charge of
of a child,- his neglect, or that of the
child in his custody, if not beyond that
to be expected of one of his age, will
not preclude a recovery for the fault of
the company: North Penn. Ry v. Mahoney, 57 Penn. St. 187.
1 We have thus given a fuller view of
the cases than we intended when we
began. But we believe it will commend
itself to the acceptance of the profession,
and if so, we shall rejoice in the accomplishment of what seemed, at one time,
a rather hopeless undertaking, the harmonizing of the apparent discrepancies
in the cases upon this general question.
I. F. R.

Supreme Court of Errorsof Connecticut.
BALLARD v. WINTER.
As a general rule the title to personal property perfected in one state, according
to the laws of that state, is.respected in all other states and countries into which
the property may come. The validity of transfers of such property depends in
general upon the place of the contract; sometimes the situs of the property is an
important consideration. These general rules are, however, subject to the exception that every state must judge for itself how far it will give effect to the laws of
other states.
The rule of law in Connecticut which requires a change of possession to accompany sales and mortgages of personal property, in order to perfect the title as
against creditors of the vendor or mortgagor, is not a mere rule of evidence, but
of positive law. But this rule does not, as such, apply to property located without the jurisdiction of the state, and ought not to be applied to a contract made in
good faith in another state, between citizens of that state, according to the laws
of that state, in relation to property there situate, with no purpose of being executed in this state, or of evading its laws.

TROVER for three head of cattle; brougt to the Superior
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Court for Tolland county, and tried on the general issue closed to
the jury.
The plaintiff claimed to have proved that on the 22d
March
1869, the plaintiff and one John L. Shaw both resided in the town
of Wilbraham, in the state of Massachusetts, on which day Shaw
had in his possession at Wilbraham, and was the owner of the
cattle described in the declaration; that Shaw on that day at
Wilbraham mortgaged the cattle, by a good and valid mortgage
deed, to the plaintiff, to secure the payment of a note described
in the mortgage, which mortgage was recorded on the records of
the town of Wilbraham, in the proper place for recording mortgages of personal property, on the 23d of March 1869, at which
time both the mortgagor and the mortgagee resided in Wilbraham,
and the cattle were there situated; that Shaw on or about the first
of April 1869, without the knowledge or consent of the plaintiff,
took the cattle to a farm in the town of Stafford, in this state, and
kept them there until on or about the 20th of January 1870, when
the defendants took them by virtue of a writ of attachment in
favor of Seaman Lull against Shaw, and converted them to their
own use.
The defendants requested the court to charge the jury, that a
mortgage of such personal property made and executed in Massachusetts would not be good and valid in this state against attaching
creditors, if the mortgagee knew that the mortgagor was residing
in this state, and had the property in his possession, and permitted
him to do so.
The court instructed the jury that if they should find that the
mortgage was duly made, executed, and recorded on the records
of the town of Wilbraham, according to the laws of Massachusetts, and that the mortgagor and mortgagee were at the time of
the execution and recording of the mortgage residents of Wilbraham, and the cattle were there situated during that time, the mortgage would convey a good title to the plaintiff, and the fact that
the mortgagor remained in possession of the cattle, and brought
them into this state, and kept them here during said time, would
not, even if he held himself out as such owner of them, without
the knowledge or consent of the mortgagee, affect the title of the
plaintiff. But if the jury should find that the plaintiff had in any
way permitted the mortgagor to hold himself out as the owner,
and the defendants had thereby been misled to their ijo,,, that
P"
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the plaintiff would now be estopped from setting up his own title
to the property.
The jury returned a verdict for the plaintiff, and the defendants
moved for a new trial for error in the charge.
R. Welles and Lull, in support of the motion.
West and Da'vison, contrA.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
SEYMOUR, J.-This is an action of trover for the alleged conversion of certain cattle. The plaintiff claims title under a mortgage deed from one Shaw. The defendant denies the validity of
the mortgage, and claims title as attaching creditor of Shaw. The
question for consideration distinctly appears in the judge's charge,
which was as follows:
"If the jury should find that the mortgage was duly made, executed and recorded on the records of the town of Wilbraham, according to the laws of Massachusetts, and that the mortgagor and
mortgagee were at the time residents of said Wiibraham, and the
cattle were there situated during that time, then said mortgage
would convey a good title to the plaintiff, and the fact that the
mortgagor remained in possession of said cattle, and brought them
into this state and kept them here during said time, would not,
even if he held himself out as owner of them, without the knowledge or consent of the mortgagee, affect the title of the plaintiff..
But if the plaintiff permitted the mortgagor to hold himself out
as owner, and the defendants had thereby been misled to their
injury, the plaintiff Would be estopped from setting up title."
We think the instructions of the judge to the jury are correct.
The mortgage was made in Massachusetts, the parties resided
there, and that was the situs of the property. The title by the
law of Massachusetts was fully vested in the plaintiff, both as between the parties to the conveyance and as to creditors and subsequent purchasers. By the general rules of law title thus perfected in one state is respected in all other states and countries
into which the property may come. The argument of the defendant is, that by Connecticut law retention of possession by the
mortgagor is conclusive evidence that the mortgage is fraudulent;
that this, being a rule of evidence, ought to be adhered to in our
courts; that the question is one of evidence, and that such questions
are to be governed by the law of the forum. But we think our
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law on this subject cannot be regarded as a mere rule of evidence,
though it is sometimes stated in that form. It is a rule whereby
we require a change of possession to accompany sales and mortgages of personal property, in order to perfect the title as against
creditors of the vendor or mortgagor. The ground indeed of the
rule is the presumption arising from such retention of possession
that the conveyance is a sham. But our law does not leave the
question open as one of fact, but gives to the want of change of
possession an artificial value, and thus far is a rule of positive law,
and not of evidence merely. But this rule of ours does not, as
such, apply to property located without the jurisdiction of the
state. We claim no right to carry our law into adjoining states.
It is familiar law that, in respect to personal property, the validity
of transfers depends in general upon the place of the contract ;
sometimes, as in questions like the present which respect delivery
of possession,, the situs of the property is an important consideration: Uoote v. Jecks, Law. Rep. 13 Eq. 597. These general
rules are subject to the exception that every state must judge for
itself how far it will give effect to laws of other states. The property in dispute here being within our jurisdiction, our courts
decide whether to apply to the case our own rules, or the laws of
Massachusetts. We regard our own rule as a good one, and to be
adhered to in respect to property within the limits of the state at
tle time of the contract, but we think the rule ought not to be
applied-to contracts made, as this appears to have been, in good
faith, in another state, between citizens of that state, in relation
to property there situate, with no purpose of being executed in
Connecticut, or of evading our laws. It would certainly be very
inconvenient if such mortgages, fairly made in Massachusetts,
should be held invalid in Connecticut in respect to movable property, which may be daily passing to and fro along the dividing
line between the states. Such mortgages have in practice been
treated as valid here, and in the Superior Court have been in
several instances decided to be so. In the Superior Court in the
case of Koster v. .lferritt, 32 Conn. 246, the same rule seems to
have been adopted which was adopted by the judge in this case in
his charge to the jury.
We therefore advise no new trial.
The foregoing case ilvolves a que-tion
of great practical importance to cotcimi-

nous states, and one that has i polhed
con-idcrable debate, and :,mie,"ntliet
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of decisions, in different states. But we
believe the great weight of authority, and
all principle, will be found in favor of
the views maintained in the opinion.
The general rule of private international law is, most unquestionably, that
all contracts, made in conformity to the
laws of the state where maae, will be
held valid in all other states, unless
made with reference to the laws of some
other state and with a view to evade
those laws. Thus in Holman v. Johnson,
I Cowp. 341, a sale of goods was held
valid in a foreign country, although the
seller knew the purchaser intended to
smuggle them into England, so long
as he did nothing to forward the illegal
act. But in Biggs v. Lawrence, 3 T.
R. 454, where the goods were packed in
such a manner, as to favor the accompiishment of the illegal purpose of the
bnyer, it was held the seller could not
recover the price of the goods, by reason
of his participation in such illegal purpose. But the general rule that contracts
valid by the law of the place where
made are valid everywhere, is of universal acceptance.
But in regard to sales and mortgages
Df personal property, made according to
the law of the place where made, and
where the property was at the time, but
which afterwards came into other states,
where different formalities were required
to perfect the sale, for some purposes,
there has been discussion, and some conflict of opinion. This question has commonly arisen in regard to the want of
change of possession of the property in
conformity with the terms of the transfer.
Thus in Louisiana, where according to
the rule of the civil law a change
of possession is required, in order to
perfect transfers of personal property,
as against the creditors of the assignor
or vendor, it has been claimed that the
same rule should be applied to transfers
of personal property made in other states,
but when the property subsequently came
into that state. But the courts held

otherwise: Thuret v. Jenkins, 7 Martin
318. But the courts of Louisiana held
that where personal property, situate in
that state, was attempted to be transferred
by the owner, resident in another state,
a change of possession was indispensable
to perfect the title against creditors :
Norris v. Mumford, 4 Martin 20 ; Ramsay v. Stevenson, 5 Id. 23; Olivier v.
Townes, 14 Id. 93. But Mr. Livingston,
Dissertations 220, 223, questions the
soundness of these decisions. But there
can be no question he is wrong, and the
cases right. The general rule that transfers of personal property, valid where
made, are valid everywhere, has been
recognised in other states: French v.
Hall, 9 N. H. 137 ; Douglass v. Oldham,
6 Id. 150. In Vermont thfe courts at
first inclined to require a change of possession to perfect transfers made in other
states, where the property then was, but
which was afterwards attached in Vermont: Skiff v. Solace, 23 Vt. 279. But
on further consideration that view has
been abandoned there, in numerous
cases: Taylor v. Boardman, 25 Vt. 581 ;
Jones v. Taylor, 30 Id. 42 ; Cobb V.
.Buswell, 37 id. 337. But the courts of
that state have made the same distinction
already adverted to as having been made
in Louisiana, in regard to property
locally situated in a state requiring
change of possession to perfect transfers, as against creditors : Rice v. Courtis,
32 Vt. 460. This exception is here
thus stated: "The local rule of policy
established in this state, requiring a
complete change of possession, in cases
of the transfer of personal property, in
order to exempt it from attachment upon
process against the transferror, is universal in its application to all personal
property actually within the state ; and
therefore it applies to and governs the
transfer of such property, though it be
owned by a resident of another state,
and be there transferred in conformity
with the laws thereof, which do not re.
quire such a change of possession to
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exempt such property from attachment."
There is one case, Montgomery v. Wight,
8 Mich. 143, which seems to hold the
same view of the law with Skiff v. Solace,
supra, but that is extending the rule of
local policy further than reason or justice seem to require. Some cases seem
to hold assignments of personal property, made in other states in conformity
with the law there, inoperative in their
own state, with a view to afford greater
facilities to their own citizens for enforcing claims against the owner, than to

non-residents:

Zipcy

v.

Thompson,

I

Gray 243. But the general rule is in
conformity with the opinion in the prin
cipal case, and this last class of cases
does not seem, at present, to meet with
much countenance. It is certainly in
conflict with the universal comity of
states resulting almost of necessity from
constant commercial intercourse, and
equally with any proper sense of equity
and justice.
I. F. R.

Court of Appeals of Kentucky.'
MOORE, &c., APPELLANT, v. POTTER, TRUSTEE, &c., APPELLEE.
LEHMAN, APPELLANT, v. POTTER, TRUSTEE, &c., APPELLEE.
Official bonds and those given by trustees for faithful administration should be
construed with reference to the period which they are intended to cover, and not
with reference to the date or the time of execution of the instrument.

from the Warren Circuit Court.
The facts sufficiently appear in the opinion of the court, which
was delivered by
PRYOR, J.-Bennett Burnam-by his last will devised to W. V.
Loving a considerable amount of money, notes, bonds, &c., to be
hold by him in trust for the exclusive use and benefit of his
daughter Lee Ann during her life, requiring him to pay the interest
annually to her and the principal to be paid to her children or
their descendants at her death, &c. In the event of the death of
Loving, the trustee, or his refusal to act, the will directs that the
judge of the Warren Circuit Court shall appoint one or more discreet trustees in his stead, and to require such bond and security
as may secure the due performance of the trust, and said appointment to be renewed from time to time when necessary; in, no state
of the case was fhe husband of Lee Ann to be made trustee. By a
.oditil to this will John Burnam and Michael 11.11 were ap)pointed
ilustecs in conjunction with Loving. Loviig alone quaiflhd as
Ii ustc. and in a lfw years after fhe t(etator's death rc,-illud his
ofltce after making a settlement of his accounts.
APPEAL
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Lee Ann was a widow at the death of her father and shortly
after married Henry Garnett, who lived only a short time. After
the rasignation of Loving the Circuit Court of Warren county
appointed T. C. Calvert trustee, and the latter gave bond as such
with Lee Ann Garnett, the beneficiary of the trust, she being then
a widow, and J. W. Calvert his sureties. This bond was executed
on the 7th of May 1863. Lee Ann (Mrs. Garnett), after Calvert's
appointment as trustee intermarried with John R. Moore. Shortly
after this marriage Mrs. Moore and her husband, in June 1870,
filed a petition in equity in the Warren Circuit Court against Calvert as trustee, and the parties entitled to the estate in remainder,
setting forth the trust and alleging that a large sum of money had
passed into Calvert's hands as trustee, and that he had only made
one report of settlement, since his qualification as such. They
also allege that "it was not right and proper that Lee Ann, the
*beneficiary, should have been accepted as surety on Calvert's bond,
and asks to be released therefrom. That J. W. Calvert, the other
surety, owned no real estate, and but little personal estate, and the
trust fund is insecure. They ask that the trust fund be invested
in county bonds and that the trustee be required to give an additional bond, and Mrs. Moore relieved from liability as surety, &c."
* * * The daughter of Mrs. Moore and. her husband file their
answer and reposing more confidence in Calvert the trustee, than
the mother, were not disposed to aid her in having additional security for this fund, although they do not directly contest her right
to have it placed in a more secure condition. The trustee, Calvert,
filed his answer insisting upon the liability of Mrs. Moore as his
surety, but alleges a willingness to renew his bond with such security as the court may require, but protests against any change
being made by which the trust fund is to be invested in county
bonds, &c. Whilst this suit was thus progressing, viz., on the 4th
of March 1870, the trustee came into court and, as the order recites,
" executed a new bond as trustee with George Lehman as surety,
which was approved by the court and filed." This bond, after
reciting the trust created by the will of Burnam, the appointment
of Calvert as trustee, reads: "The court now requires a new bond
with additional security. Now we, Thomas Calvert, trustee, and
George Lehman, surety, covenant with (the parties interested) that
Calvert shall faithfully discharge all of his duties as trustee, and
shall well and truly hold, manage, control and pay out the property

MOORE v. POTTER.

or funds which may come to his hands or possession as trustee as required by law," &c. The bond in substance is such a bond as he
was required to execute when originally appointed, &c. Before
the termination of this action, it having been referred to a commissioner for a settlement of the accounts of Calvert as trustee
with Mrs. Moore, Calvert became bankrupt, fled the country, ana
was no doubt insolvent when the action was instituted. Potter,
the present appellee, was then appointed trustee by the court, and
having executed bond, filed the present action as trustee for Mrs.
Moore and others upon both of the bonds executed by Calvert as
trustee, viz., the bond executed by J. W. Calvert and Lee Ann
Moore (the cestui que use), as his sureties on the 7th of May 1863
and the bond executed by George Lehman on the 4th of March
1870. It is alleged in the petition that Calvert has wasted, or
failed to account for the trust fund amounting to near $20,000,
and a judgment asked against the sureties on each of the bonds
for that amount. On motion of the defendants the cause was
transferred to the equity docket. Lehman, the surety in the last
bond, admits its execution, but denies any liability on his part except for the trust fund actually in the hands of Calvert at the date
of its execution; alleges that the trustee was then insolvent, and
had prior to that time disposed of and squandered the whole fund;
that if made liable for any part of the trust fund the sureties
in'the first bond must contribute ; insisting that neither of those
sureties were discharged upon the execution of the bond by him.
Lee Ann Moore answers and says she is not liable in law or equity
on the bond executed by her as surety of her own trustee, and if
ever liable, that she was released by the execution of the bond with
Lehman as surety in March 1870. Upon the issues thus made,
the court.below adjudged that the sureties on each bond were liable
for the trust fund, and rendered judgment against Lehman therefor, and directed the trustee to withhold the interest accruing in
the fund in order to meet Lee Ann Moore's portion of the judgment, and continued the cause for further determination as to the
rights of the sureties. From this judgment the sureties in each
bond prosecute this appeal.
The object that Mrs. Moore's father had in view when he
created the trust for her benefit by this express provision
of his will was to secure to her the annual interest upon
the fund in controversy for her support and maintenance, and
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as a means of securing it for this purpose he intrusted the
Warren Circuit Court with the duty of selecting a trustee who
would faithfully administer and control the trust fund, and required
that tribunal to exact a bond from the trustee for its faithful performance. Calvert was appointed the trustee by the court, and
Lee Ann the daughter of the devisor and the beneficiary for life
of the profits from the fund, accepted as his surety. The present
trustee Potter, who has now been selected by the court in lieu of
Calvert, brings this suit in the name of the commonwealth for his
benefit, and the benefit of Lee Ann Moore, against Lee Ann
Moore, seeking to deprive the cetui que use, not only of her income
derived from the trust property, but to make her liable for the
whole of the trust fund; this has been done by the judgment of
the court below. The sole object and design of the trust has been
subverted, and the principal beneficiary made liable not only to
the extent of the loss of her entire interest but for the whole trust
estate. The trustee institutes his action for Lee Ann Moore,
against Lee Ann Moore, and although there is no demurrer to the
petition, still we must adjudge that the trustee cannot maintain
such an action against his cestui que use. Whether or not Mrs.
Moore can be made liable to those in remainder in an action by
them on her bond, is a question hot necessary now to determine.
The appellant (Mrs Moore) insists that if she was ever liable by
the execution of the bond as Calvert's surety, she was released
upon the execution of the bond by Lehman, and we think this view
of the questions presented is fully sustained by the law and facts
of the case.
The cases referred to by counsel for the trustee indicate clearly
the power of the County Court to refease sureties in a guardian's
bond under the Act of 1797. In the cases of Hutcheraft v. ,Shrout's
Heirs, 1 Mon. 206; and Wilborne v. The Commonwealth, 5 J. J.
Marshall 617, supplemental or additional bonds were executed by
the guardian, and it was held that the sureties in each bond must bear
the burden equally. It does not appear that these bonds were procured to be executed with a view of exonerating the sureties in
the first bond, but only as additional obligations to indemnify the
justices from responsibility, it was held, however, by the court in
each of these cases that the County Court could have released the
sureties in the first bond by making an order to that effect at the
time of the execution of the supplemental bond.
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In the cases of Fredericcv. Moore, 13 B. ionroe 470, and Boyd
v. Gault, 3 Bush 644, it is adjudged that when one of the sureties in
the first bond asks to be exonerated from liability, and at his instance
a new bond is executed, he is thereby released, and the remaining
sureties in the first bond having failed to ask relief, must contribute
jointly with the sureties in the second bond in discharging the
liability of the principal.
Under the Act of 1797, the County Court derived its power to
release a surety from this provision of the law, viz. : "Shall order
him (the guardian) to give counter security, or deliver the ward's
estate into the hands of the surety, or some other person, taking
sufficient security therefor, or may make such other order for the
relief of the petitioner as to them shall seem just." As there was
no express power given the court to release the surety by this
statute, it was held that the execution of a supplemental bond, or
an additional bond, could only be regarded as a further indemnity
in the absence of an order of court releasing the surety.
Chap. 97, of the Revised Statutes, 2d vol. page 96, provides,
That when a surety or his representative wishes for good cause to
be relieved from further liability as such in the official bond of
any officer, &c., he may by notice require him to appear "and
give a new bond with other surety," &c.
Section 2 provides that "If a new bond be given, the surety
shall not be bound for any act of the principal thereafter."
Section 3 of the same act provides that the surety of any
fiduciary, or other person other than a personal representative or
guardian giving bond pursuant to law, "may in like manner be
relieved by the execution of a new bond with other surety." This
is the only statute now in force providing for the relief of sureties in fiducial bonds, except the statute in regard to guardians and
personal representatives.
This petition of Lee Ann MAoore and her husband was filed for
the purpose of having the former released from liability as surety
in the first bond executed by Calvert. The only power the Chancellor had over the case was to require a new bond, or if the proof
authrized it, to take from the trustee the custody of' the trust
fund upon the refusal to execute a new bond. Callvcrt came into
corn t, and in aceordance with the prayer of the 1 )etition cxecuted a
new bond with Lehman as surety. This bond was approved by
the co urt and filed. When this was done the object of the action
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was accomplished and Mrs. Moore released from liability. It was
not necessary that an order of court should have been made releasing her as surety. The execution of the new bond had this
effect, and if there had been no reference to the master for a settlement of the trustee's accounts, the court could only have dismissed the petition.
It is insisted by counsel for Lehman, that the execution of the
new bond only made the latter liable for the future conduct of the
trustee in the control of the fund, and that he is sustained in this
by the language of the act under which this proceeding is had,
viz.: "If a new bond be given the surety shall not be bound for
any act of the principal thereafter."
This court in the case of Watts v. Pettitt'sieirs,1 Bush 154, in
the construction of the Act of March 1st 1856, 1 Stanton 581, with
reference to the liability of sureties on guardians' bonds, has in
effect decided the questions involved here. The language of that
act is, "If a guardian shall give his bond when ruled to do so by
the court, his former security shall not be bound for any act of his
thereafter." It was adjudged that the surety in the first bond
was released from all liability upon the execution of the new bond,
and could not be made responsible for any act of the guardian
prior to its execution. The purpose of the statute is to relieve
the surety, and the meaning to be attached to the word "thereafter"
is that his liability no longer continues, that he is, upon the execution of the new bond, released from all responsibility. If it
was intended by the statute that this bond should only be regarded
as an additional security, it would have been so written. The plain
purpose of the law is to relieve the surety. The appellant, Mrs.
Moore, sought the benefit of its provisions, and as surety is asking
to be released. This bond then must either be regarded as releasing the surety existing, or as a bond for counter security: the
latter construction cannot be given it, as the statute does not contemplate the execution of any such instrument.
The trustee, Calvert, at the time of the filing of this action and
during its pendency, was presumed to have the trust fund in his
hands; he could have been proceeded against by rule, and required to bring the money into court, and it will not do for his
security when upon executing the new bond he has satisfied the
Chancellor that the trust fund is secure, and released those who
made known its danger and ware directly interested in having it
VOL. XXI.-50
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secured, to say that the trustee was insolvent when I signed the
bond. This is no defence to the action.
It was not only the object of Lee Ann Moore to be released as
surety, but it was evidently the intention of Lehman that his bond
should have that effect, and if not, such is the law. The proposition may be true, that in the absence of any statute extending
the liability of sureties in a bond, it ought to begin only with their
undertaking, still here is a statutory regulation determining the
liability of the surety, and he must be so held.
The judgment is affirmed as to Lehman, and reversed as to Lee
Ann Moore, and remanded for further proceedings consistent with
this opinion.
The foregoing case seems to us to involve questions of some practical importance ; and the result to which the
court arrive does not appear to us as open
to any serious question. The only doubt
in the case seems to be, whether the last
bond can properly be made to cover any
default of the trustee, which occurred before its execution, and this will depend
largely upon whether it was intended to
cover such default. There is no question whatever, that official bonds, and
.those executed by persons in fiduciary
relations, for faithful administration,
have generally been construed strictly,
a, to the time which they are intended
to cover, and that they will not, except
under peculiar circumstances, be extended beyond such defaults as occur after
their execution and before the term expires for which they were given. Thus
a bond conditioned for the faithful service of J. S. to a sole trader, does not
nstaain obligatory after another person
hi, beer taken into the business : Wright
v. ui-ell, 2 W. Black. 934 ; s. c., 3
Wil. 530.
Aud even where the bond is
for the f-ttil accounting of a (lerk of
nilouey fe(rivedl to the use 01 his
colil"yer, the sutit:- will not I t I hleu
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Lord ELLENBOROUGH. And when a
bond was given to secure the payment
by the principal of all sums advanced by
the banking house of C. D. & E., it was
held the obligation ceased on the death
of C., and did not cover advances subsequently made by the house: Strange
v. Lee, 3 East 484. And when the
bond was drawn to cover advances made
to A. & B. partners, or either of them,
it was held not to extend to bills drawn
by B. after the death of A.: Shipson v.
Cooke, 8 Moore 588 ; 1 Bing. 452. Nor
will a bond drawn to repay all sums advanced by five persons named, or any of
them, extend to sums advanced after the
death of one of them, aithotigh coming
strictly within the terms of tite in.trument : 1[estoa v. Barton, 4 Taut. 673.
And ont the other hand, a compliance
with the words of the obligation by it
collector of revenue paying over all the
money collected by him during tite tert
covered by the bond, provided it be
credited to tlme aecountt of former Years,
will not discharge the bond : Gwqn v.
Jarwid, 7 Cl. & Fin. 572. Th-c- eaics,
and ahno11t any mttnlmtbutof similar ones
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And although the court, in the prinstipal case, must be admitted to have departed somewhat from the strict construction of the terms of the obligation
with reference to the time of its execution, it seems to have been only so far
as was indispensable to render it applicable to, and commensurate with, the
purpose for which it was taken. If the
court are correct and well founded in
their construction of the statutes, under
which the bond in suit was taken, and
we should not feel at liberty to call in
question the decision of the highest
court in a state in regard to the construction of the statutes of the state,
it was designed to be a substitute for
the former bond which, of course, after
the substitution of another bond in its
place, became wholly inoperative and
nothing remained but the substituted
bond. And although such substituted
bond was expressed, as was natural, in
the future tense, "1shall" perform his

duties as trustee, the terms are not necessarily to be understood with reference to
the date of the bond, which might be
wrong, or even wholly omitted, without
affecting the validity of the instrument,
but the terms rather derive their impori
from the occasion, or purpose of taking
the bond, and thus are made to speak
from the time at which it became operative, the same as a will speaks from the
death of the testator, when it first becomes
operative. We have looked into the
briefs on the part of the defendants in
this case and are not surprised, they
should feel some disappointment, at the
facility with which the court escaped from
the argument founded upon the terms of
the bond. But the decision seems to us
very just and proper, and we should
have regarded one in the opposite direc.
tion, as exceedingly lame and unsatisfactory. We always rejoice to have
courts fairly meet the exigency of the
I. F. R.
cases before them.

Supreme Court of Missouri.
A. P. FITZGERALD v. HAYWARD

ET AL.

In a contract which stipulates that certain work is to be performed within a
fixed time, a refusal to comply with the terms to be deemed an abandonment and
forfeiture of all rights under it, the time is of the essence of the contract.
On a failure to comply with the terms, the party damnified has a right to employ
others to perform the work, and will not be held responsible for the profit the contractor might have made.
Instructions which cover the whole case should be so framed as to meet the points
raised by the evidence and pleadings on both sides.
The statutes of Missouri, authorizing the courts to refer issues of fact to a referee
in certain cases, are directory only and not mandatory.
A witness is only allowed to detail facts and not mere opinions not based on
ractq.
appeal from the Court of Common Pleas of lAfacon county.
This was an action on a special contract entered into between
the plaintiff and one Smith, with the defendants, by the terms of
O

which the plaintiff and Smith undertook to do grading on section
22, and the grading and masonry on section 23 of the Hannibal
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and Central Missouri Railroad, to be commenced immediately
(November 10th 1869), and prosecuted with sufficient force to insure completion by the 1st day of June 1870, the work to be done
in such manner as should be directed by tne engineer in charge
of the work, or other agent of the defendants; to be prosecuted
with such speed as should be required by the defendants to completion. The work to be first class of its kind, to be done to the
satisfaction of the engineer. The work as it progressed was to
be paid for monthly, according to certain rates specified.
The payments were to be made on estimates to be made monthly
by the engineer, and 10 per cent. of the same was to be reserved
as security for the completion of the contract, and in case of failure
to complete the contract, this reservation to remain as liquidated
damages in the hands of defendants for such non-fulfilment. In
making payments the defendants reserved the right to pay off the
hands and workmen of plaintiff and Smith, and deduct same from
amounts due them. A. persistent refusal to comply with the provisions of the agreement was to work a forfeiture of the rights of
plaintiff and Smith, and entitle defendants to enter upon and take
possession of the premises without let or hindrance, -and to relet
the same.
The plaintiff bought out Smith's interest in the contract and
.took an assignment thereof to himself, and brought this suit in his
own name, for an alleged balance due him under the contract for
work done and completed, and also for damages as net profits for
the remainder of the work, alleging that he was wrongfully prevented from doing the same by the defendants, who took possession
themselves, and prevented him from proceeding with the work.
The defendants set up that they had fully paid the plaintiff in
money, and by paying his hands large amounts for all the work
that was done, and that the 10 per cent. reserved bad been forfeited
to them, and denied that they wrongfully prevented the plaintiff
from completing the work. They charged that the plaintiff abandoned the work, and did not, although urged by them to do so,
proceed with the work with sufficient force to complete it by the
1st of June 1870, and that in compliance with the agreement,
they took possession with a gang of hands of their own, so as to
complete the same in time, &c., &c.
When the case was called for trial, the defendants insisted that
it should be referred to a referee. The plaintiff wanted a jury
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trial and the court refused to refer the case as asked by the defendants, and to this ruling the defendants excepted. Upon the
trial before the jury, each party gave evidence tending to prove
the issues as raised by each, and some objections were made to the
manner in which the witnesses were allowed to testify, giving their.
opinions as to estimates of damages on the facts as d6tailed by
them. The jury found a verdict for the plaintiff for $4375.43.
James Uafr, for appellant.
Williams & Eberman, for appellee.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
ADAMS, J.-It is unnecessary to notice in detail the objections
to the answers of the witnesses, as we do not think them material.
The question of experts does not apply to the facts of this case.
A witness can only be allowed to detail facts, and not mere opinions
not based upon facts. But in estimating the cost of work, &c.,
he must give the facts, and may be allowed to state what his estimate is upon the facts detailed.
The only points necessary to consider in this case grow out of
the instructions given and refused. At the instance of the plaintiff, and against respondent's objections, the court gave six instructions. The first stated what admissions the pleadings made, the
second reads, "If the jury find from the evidence that defendants
in March 1870 took possession of the work on sections 22 and
23, and thereby prevented the plaintiff from completing said work,
he is entitled to recover as damages the difference between the
cost of the work remaining to be done at the time the defendants
took possession, and the price that defendants agreed by the contract, read in evidence, to pay plaintiff for such work."
The third instruction merely lays down a rule for estimating
the damages, in case the jury should find for plaintiff, apd does
not seem to be objectionable. The fourth instruction reads: "If
the defendants took possession of the work on sections 22 and 23
in March 1870, and prevented plaintiff from completing said work,
they have no right ta retain the ten per cent. reserved by them."
The fifth instruction asserts that a mere temporary suspension of
the work caused by meeting among the employees, or other trouble,
was not an abandonment of the work sufficient to justify th defendants in taking possession of the work and completing it themselves."
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The sixth merely states that it is admitted by the pleadings that
defendants took possession on the 23d of March 1870. The defendants asked ten instructions. The first, fifth, sixth, seventh.
ninth and tenth were given, and it is therefore unnecessary to set
them out. The second, third, fourth and eighth were refused. By
the second the jury were told that "If they believe from the evidence that the plaintiff failed or neglected to prosecute the grading
and masonry to be done on said sections 22 and 23, with sufficient
force to insure its completion by the 1st day of June 1870, then
plaintiff has broken the contract sued on, and is not entitled to
recover on his claim for damages on account of the work remaining
to be done on the 21st day of March 1870, unless they shall
further believe from the evidence that defendants by their wrongful
acts prevented plaintiff from completing said contract."
The third instruction asserts that if the defendants by their
agent Eaton, repeatedly requested plaintiff to prosecute the work
with such speed as to insure Its completion by the 1st June 1870,
and plaintiff failed or neglected to do so, then he had broken his
contract and is not entitled to recover for damages on account of
the work remaining to be done, unless the defendants by their
wrongful acts prevented him from performing the contract.
The fourth instruction recites a long list of facts, which if found
it requires the jury to find for the defendants.
The eighth instruction asserts that the estimates of the engineer
in charge of the work remaining to be done, is the rule and guide
for the jury in making their verdict.
1. By the terms of the agreement sued on, the time for the
completion of the work was of the very essence of the contract.
The defendants were original contractors with the railroad company for the building of this road, and had bound themselves to
complete it by a specified time. Hence it became necessary in
letting out parts of the road to have the sections so let out finished
by a specified day. They reserved to themselves the right to
require the work to be prosecuted with sufficient force and speed
to effect the desired end, and if there should be a persistent refusal on the part of plaintiff to comply with any of the provisions
of the contract, the defendants could enter upon and take possession of the sections without let or hhidrance on the part of the
plaintiff.
The question whether the plaintiff did not keep sufficient force
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and persistently neglected or refused to prosecute the work with
the speed necessary to its completion by the contemplated time,
so as to entitle the defendants to take possession, was the main
point upon which the right of the plaintiff to recover for profits
on unperformed work depended, and yet this point is wholly
ignored by the instructions given for the plaintiff. These instructions place the plaintiff's right to recover for unperformed work,
upon the simple fact that the defendants entered upon and prevented him from performing the work. In ordinary contracts,
this would have been sufficient, but by the terms of this contract
the defendants had the right in a certain contingency to make such
entry without let or hindrance on part of the plaintiff.
Instructions which cover the whole case ought to be so framed
as to meet the points raised by the evidence and pleadings on
both sides. "A party therefore who asks an instruction on the
whole case, must not frame it so as to exclude from the consideration of the jury the points raised by the evidence of his adversary:" Clark v. H1ammerfe, 27 Mo. 70; Sawyer v. 17an. &.
St. Jos. B?. BR. Co., 37 Mo. 263. It is only where the plaintiff
has been prevented from performance by the wrongful acts of the
defendants that he is entitled to recover. A simple breach of the
contract on the part of defendants, such as non-payment of the
monthly dues for work done, would not authorize the plaintiff to
stop work and recover for unperformed work. Such a breach might
justify him in abandoning the work, and entitle him to recover for
the work already done; but for a mere breach of the contract on the
part of his adversaries, he cannot stop the work and recover for
alleged profits on unperformed work. To entitle him to such recovery he must be prevented from proceeding with the work by
the unauthorized interference of the parties.
In this case, however, we have seen the parties were authorized
to interfere and take possession when the. plaintiff persistently
refused or neglected to comply with the provisions of the contract.
On these grounds, the 2d and 4th instructions given for the plaintiff were erroneous. I see no objections to the other instructions
given for plaintiff. The 2d and 3d instructions asked by the
defendants which were refused should have been given. The 4th
instruction on the part of defendants, asserts facts, which if found
to be true, constituted a total abandonment of the work by the
plaiutiff and authorized the defendants to enter upon the premises.
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I cannot see upon what principle this instruction was refused. It
was not covered by any instruction that had been given. It seems
to me the court erred in refusing this instruction. The 8th
instruction for defendant was properly refused. The estimates of
the engineer in charge were to be the guide in reference to
performed work, but not in regard to work remaining to be performed, and for which damages were claimed.
2. The defendants insist that the court was bound to refer this
case to a referee, and had no right to submit it to a jury. Sec.
12, art. 9 (2 Wagner's Statutes 1040), provides that " An issue of
fact in an action for the recovery of money only, or specific real
or personal property, must be tried by a jury, unless a jury trial
be waived or reference ordered as hereinafter provided." Section
17 of the same article (2 Wag. Stat. 1040), provides that " all or
any of the issues of fact in the action may be referred upon the
written consent of the parties." Sec. 18 of same article provides
that "where the parties do not so consent, the court may, upon
the application of either or on its own motion, direct a reference
in the following cases. First, when the trial of an issue of fact
shall require the examination of a long account on either side, in
which case the referees may be directed to hear and decide the
whole issue, or to report upon any specific question of fact involved
therein; or second, when the taking of an account shall be necessary for the information of the court before judgment, or for
carrying a judgment or order into effect; or third, where a
question of fact other than upon the pleadings shall arise upon
motion or otherwise in any stage of the action."
These are the only sections bearing on the subject of reference.
It is plain to my mind that the whole subject of reference is a
matter of discretion.
The court is not bound in any case to make a reference. The
statute is not mandatory but directory, and it rests in the discretioti of the court whether in a proper case falling within the provision of these sections it will order a reference. It is unnecessary
to discuss whether this case is among fhe class of cases ihich the
court may on its own motion refer. It is a case f,i the rccovhry
of money only, ad therefore a case fliat canmot .e ti ied by the
t ierhy a
coirt without 111c consent of tlile lmlti,.s, it 1must l],,
juiy, uiless fli, parties waive a jury, or it ile-. tie c,,trt ini it
disetivo dee, it to contain the c.%amimation of suchl long ac
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counts as to require a reference. I see no error in the rulings of
the court on this point.
For the errors in regard to the instructions, the judgment will
be reversed and the cause remanded.

United States Circuit Court, Westerm District of Wisconsin.
HENRY PERKINS v.THE CITY OF WATERTOWN.
When the charter of a city authorizes suits to be commenced against it by the
service of process upon the mayor, the courts of the United States are bound since
the Act of Congress of June 1st 1872, to conform to the same manner of service.
State laws when adopted by Congress become obligatory on the Federal courts.
Service on the mayor elect before acceptance or qualification, is not a service
on the mayor of the city.
Where there is no mayor nor acting mayor, service on the city clerk and city
treasurer is not sufficient.
Courts must administer the law as they find it, and not supply defects in legislation when a difficult or hard case presents itself.

THIS was a motion to set aside as insufficient the service in the
above-named and four other suits.
The facts appear in the opinion of the court.
W. P. Vilas and . Ordway, for plaintiff.
Hfarlow Pease, for defendants.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
HOPKINS, D. J.-In one of the above-entitled cases, the summons was served by delivering copy to the mayor elect before he
had accepted or qualified.
In other cases the summons was served on the city clerk and
city treasurer, the marshal returning that there was neither mayor
or acting mayor upon whom he could serve the same.
The charter of the city authorizes suits to be commenced against
it by the service of process upon the mayor, and the question now
presented is whether it can be served upon any other officer or
party, so as to give this court jurisdiction.
Rule 30, of this court (Common Law), is as follows: "In suits
against corporations the process may be served in the mode prescribed by the laws of the state. But a judge of the court, in
peculiar cases, on motion may prescribe any other mode of service
he may deem right and proper." This rule was adopted in 1870.
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Under it authority is given (in peculiar cases) to a judge of the
court to prescribe other modes of service, but in all ordinary cases
it adopts the mode of service prescribed by the state statutes.
My associate expressed some doubt as to the power of the court
to make such a rule originally, but that question not being necessarily before the court, no decision of it was reached. In these
cases no order bad been made changing the mode of service from
that prescribed by the state statutes, but it was claimed by the
plaintiffs that if an order could have been made authorizing service
to have been made on the parties in fact served, the court could
now ratify such service, and in that view the power of a judge to
grant an order changing the statutory mode of service, since the
passage of the Act of Congress of June 1st 1872, becomes material.
It is claimed that it abrogates that part of the rule authorizing
any other mode of service than is prescribed by the state statute.
The 5th section of the act above mentioned adopts the "practice, pleading and forms and modes of proceeding," as near as
need be, of the state courts in common-law cases, and abrogates all
rules of the Circuit or District Courts to the contrary. This
court, by the rule itself above quoted, adopted the state mode of
service, so that it cannot now consistently hold it to be impracticable to conform to that mode, and if it is practicable, by the act
above quoted, it is exclusive. The state practice or mode is the
rule now on the subject, and this court has no more power to authorize any other mode than the state courts have. State laws,
when adopted by Congress, become obligatory on the Feicral
courts. There can be no doubt but that the service of proce's is
a "mode of proceeding." Similar phraseology in the Act of 1792.
1 Statutes at Large 275, was construed in J'a 1lmagnt v. ',utld,
10 Wheaton 1 (6 Curtis 319), to inelue,l the -criice of procoss.
The court there say: " It may, then, and ought to be understood
as prescribing the conduct of the officer in the execution of pIr.cess,
that being a part of the proceedings in the suit." This would seem
to settle the question that the service of proce.-s is witiin the
meaning of the Act of June 1st 1872, and being so tlhe mode of
qiili,. followed.i an, the
service prescribed by the state laws
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courts should be appealed to or should grant any special advantages in their favor. The corporation is created by the state legislature, its powers and rights emanate from that source, and if there
are defects in the organic law, it is for the legislature and not the
courts, to correct them.
It was argued that by the original charter service of process
might be on the mayor or clerk, and that the legislature could not
alter the charter in that respect, after the issue of these bonds.
That point we do not think well taken. It was not a part of the
contract in any sense, and the legislature could prescribe a different
mode without impairing the obligation of the contract.
The service on the mayor elect before acceptance or qualification,
was not a service on the mayor of the city. We therefore think
the service in each case was insufficient to give this court jurisdiction of the defendant.
It was stated and shown by the papers that there was no mayor
or acting mayor upon whom service could be made under the state
law; but that does not augment the power of this court, or confer
upon it legislative authority. Courts must administer the law as
they find it, not supply defects in legislation when 'a difficult or
hard case presents itself.
Such considerations are to be addressed to the law-making power,
not to the courts. But as the service in these several cases is
wholly insufficient to give jurisdiction, these motions are unnecessary, and defendant is not entitled to any relief as it is not injured
thereby. The plaintiffs may withdraw from the files the summons
in each case, and redeliver them to the marshal for service according to law, if they wish to do so. And an order to that effect may
be entered.

United States .DistrictCourt, Northern -Districtof illinois.
FULTON v. BLAKE.
Consignees must provide such reasonable dock-room as their business ordinarily
requires, and for failure to do so they are liable to damages in the nature of demurragn, whether so contracted in the bill of lading or not.
A consignee who has provided sufficient dock-room for vessels consigned to him
as they usually arrive, is not at fault when from causes over which he has no con
trol they all arrive together. He is not obliged to procure other docks ; his vessels arriving out of the time when they ought reasonably to have been expected
must await their turn at his docks.
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By the custom of the port of Chicago one day is allowed the consignee to provide a dock, and this custom, unless rendered unreasonable by controlling circumstances, should be considered a part of the contract.
The Chicago fire was such an intervention of unforeseen circumstances as ex cuses delay in persons whose business facilities were disarranged.

THIS was a libel in personam, by H. C. Fulton, as owner of the
schooner Kate Hinehman, against C. A. Blake and F. Al. Whitehouse as consignees, for damages in the nature of demurrage.
In the latter part of September 1871, the firm of 0. A. Blake
& Co., of Buffalo, N. Y., loaded on board said schooner Kate
Hinchman 426 tons Lehigh coal, consigned to Blake, Whitehouse
& Co., of Chicago, at a freight of fifty cents per ton.
The schooner sailed with her cargo on the 29th of September,
and arrived in the port of Chicago on the evening of the 16th of
October with her cargo on board, and on the morning of the 17th
the consignees were notified of her arrival and readiness to discharge cargo. The bill of lading contained no stipulation in regard to demurrage. The consignees were engaged in the coal
business in Chicago, occupying two docks-one on the north branch
of Chicago river near Indiana street, capable of accommodating
two vessels at a time, and the other near Eighteenth street, on the
south branch, capable of unloading only one vessel at a time.
Their dock at Indiana street was injured by the great fire of October 9th, and nearly all the employees at that dock were burned
out, and no efficient help to unload there was obtainable for many
days after the fire.
Wlien the Hinchman arrived the Indiana street dock was occupiel by other vessels unloading coal, and she was directed to proceed to tile Eighteenth street dock, her towage bill being paid by
respondents. This dock was occupied by the schooner King, which
had arrived two days before the Ilinehman, although she had
sailed from Buffalo eight days after, and the Hinchnan did not get
alotgide the dock so as to commence undoading until the afternoon
oft the 21st, and completed unloading on the 23d of October.
Th 0e responlents' business was such that they expected to, receive
:Mnd unl,,ad at their (locks during the months of Sep'ial)(i. and
(- 1,r of lat vo:ar about t.,ur eargovs pe r w(el:, and tlin had
•lq 1,"fa.iliti: t';, unloadinl,. ;bat nutlt,..
The r.- ,ml, 1t. un.oad.d vessels coni -incd to the.m in the , itr in whilh ii,
l ii ni iland reported themselves ready to unload. The usual tim-. at that

FULTON v. BLAKE.

.enson of the year, for a voyage from Buffalo to Chicago was
twelve days.
It was admitted that by a general usage and custom in Chicago,
the consignee of a vessel is allowed one day after notice of her
arrival in which to provide a dock or place for unloading her. The
respondents had machinery at their docks, by which they were
able to unload coal from a vessel at the rate of ten tons per hour
from each hatch, which was much more rapidly than it could be
done at any other dock in the city.
W. H. Condon, for libellant.
Judd . Wh-itehouse, for respondents.
BLODGETT, J.-The amount involved in this suit is not of rhuch
consequence to either party, but the principle is important to all
freighters, consignees and vessel owners.
It is objected that a suit will not lie for damages against the
consignee unless there is an express stipulation for demurrage in
the charter-party or bill of lading, and, technically speaking, the
respondents' counsel may be correct; but when the consignee of
goods is notified by the carrier of his readiness to deliver the
goods, it is the duty of the consignee to either refuse to receive
the goods, which under certain circumstances, not necessary now
to mention, he may do, or to provide a place for the reception of
the goods within a reasonable time, and what shall be deemed a
reasonable time must always be a question of fact, to be determined by the circumstances of each case. By the custom and
usage of this port, one day is allowed the consignee of a vessel
after notice of her arrival, in which to provide a dock at which
she can unload, and this custom, unless rendered unreasonable by
controlling circumstances, should undoubtedly be considered as
part of the contract.
It is also the duty of a person who is engaged in such business
as to require him to expect or anticipate the arrival of vessels
with cargoes consigned to him, to provide or arrange for sufficient
dock-room to unload vessels as they arrive in this port under
ordinary circumstances within one day after arrival. That is to
say, persons to whom vessels are consigned must provide such
reasonable dock-room as their business ordinarily requires.
If a man's business is such that he would naturally receive two
or three cargoes a week, he should provide dock-room for that
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number as they arrive in the order of sailing; but if by reason
of baffling winds or other delays, over which the consignee has ne
control, all of those vessels should arrive at once, instead of arriving in order of sailing day, as he had reason to expect them.
the consignee who has provided dock-room to accommodate three
or four or a half-dozen vessels a week, as they may successively
arrive from day to day, is certainly not in fault if, from the poor
sailing quality of some, or head winds or other causes over which
he has no control, they all arrive on the same day, when he had a
right to expect them on successive days in the order of sailing.
And if, by reason of any such unexpected occurrence, several
vessels arrive together, he is not obliged to procure other docks,
but the vessels must respectively await their turns at the consignee's docks. This rule is more specially applicable to sailing
vessels, which from their mode of propulsion are more uncertain
in their times of arrival than vessels propelled by steam.
All persons engaged in dealing with ships, whether master,
crew or consignee, are bound to give them dispatch, and whoever
causes any unreasonable delay is answerable in damages.
A consignee to whom the cargo of a vessel is consigned should,
within the time prescribed by the custom of the port, after notice
of the arrival of the vessel, furnish a suitable place for unloading,
or he shall pay damages for detention, whether demurrage be
noted on the bill of lading or not. It may not be what is technically called demurrage in the books, but it is damages for unreasonable detention, unless the vessel has arrived so far out of
her expected time as to make such prompt dispatch unreasonable;
in which case he must give her such dispatch as is reasonable
under the circumstances.
And probably as safe a general rule as can be laid down is that
if the consignee had provided ample docks for the accommodation
of the vessels consigned to him in their order, vessels arriving out
of the time when they ought reasonably to have been expected
must await their turn at the docks; although this rule may have
;ts exceptions, and should never be vexatiously or unnecessarily
enforced to the delay and damage of a vessel. The interests of
commerce, and that term as used by the courts means the interest
of the pubhc, requires that ships should be kept moving.
"Ships," says one author, "were made to plough the sea, and
not to lie rotting at the wharfs."

